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Abstract
Recent empirical evidence suggests that important disparities exist between willingness to pay and
compensation demanded for the same good. These results, which clearly contradict closely held economic
doctrines, have led some inﬂuential commentators to call for an entirely new economic paradigm to
displace conventional neoclassical theory. This study examines the generality of these experimental ﬁndings
by going to a well-functioning marketplace and examining more than 350 individual decisions across two
incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms. The data suggest that behavior of individuals with intense
experience approaches neoclassical predictions: any observed WTA/WTP disparity amongst this group is
negligible.
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A fundamental postulate of neoclassical theory is that preferences between two goods are
independent of the consumer’s reference point. This basic independence assumption naturally
leads to the prediction that with small income effects and many available substitutes, the
willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) measures of value for a commodity
should be roughly equivalent. While most theoretical and applied economic models invoke this
assumption, it has been directly refuted in several experimental settings (e.g., [9]).
1 Some
commentators have argued, however, that these ﬁndings represent merely a mistake made by
inexperienced consumers and that through time the behavior of those consumers will be more in
line with predictions from neoclassical models (e.g., [3,5,15]). While this argument has intuitive
appeal, critics contend that the available evidence is mixed at best, and that overall the data do not
conclusively support the learning premise [13,14].
In this study, I take a different approach to understanding the market learning process by
observing actual market behavior. This approach provides me with an opportunity to observe
behavior of agents that have endogenously selected into certain roles within the market, such as
being an intense or casual consumer, while simultaneously making use of certain controls afforded
in an experiment. This methodology may lead to different results than in an experiment where the
roles are exogenously induced by the experimenter (i.e., some subjects are given experience while
others are not), but a rigorous examination of behavior in an actual environment is an important
step in testing the validity of economic theory.
The speciﬁc goals of this study are twofold. First, I compare WTA statements of value with
WTP and ‘‘endowment-adjusted’’ WTP values gathered via two incentive-compatible institutions:
a random nth price auction and the Becker et al. [2] discrete choice auction.
2 Standard neoclassical
arguments suggest that the results of several previous experimental tests that found a disparity
between WTA and WTP values (e.g., [5,13]) may be consonant with neoclassical theory after all,
since these studies compared value estimates from different indifference curves and thus different
marginal rates of substitution applied.
3 By comparing WTA and endowment-adjusted WTP, I
control for income and substitution effects and therefore provide a more appropriate comparison
of value measures. This distinction allows a cleaner test of alternative theories. Second, I push the
substitutability argument a bit harder by examining whether exogenous changes in substitutability
inﬂuence the WTA/WTP disparity.
The empirical results provide some interesting insights. First, I ﬁnd that intense consumers (i.e.,
those consumers that have a history of active market participation) display a negligible value
disparity in both elicitation institutions. This result is in accord with List [17,18], and provides a
robustness check of his main ﬁndings in much different institutional settings. Second, I ﬁnd that
neoclassical theory does an adequate jobof organizing the data from experienced consumers, as
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1Early evidence of the anomaly was found in contingent valuation studies (see, e.g., [4]). The interested reader should
see Horowitz and McConnell [8] for a literature review of WTA/WTP studies. Throughout the paper I will refer to the
difference in compensation demanded and willingness to pay as the WTA/WTP disparity.
2Since impacts of alternative market institutions have been found to be non-trivial in other settings (see, e.g., [21,24]),
a comparison of value statements across institutions seems worthwhile.
3A similar argument can be made concerning studies, such as [3], which compare movements along different portions
of the same indifference curve.
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better approximates WTA than does WTP, and (ii) the estimate of the effect of income changes on
WTP provided by the observed WTA/WTP disparity is more reasonable for intense consumers
than for casual consumers. Furthermore, if one takes into account informational asymmetries,
neoclassical theory provides an adequate explanation for patterns observed in the pooled data.
Third, I ﬁnd some evidence that exogenous changes in substitutability inﬂuence the degree of the
WTA/WTP disparity.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical structure to the
experimental design. Section 3 summarizes the empirical results. Section 4 discusses limitations of
the study. Section 5 concludes with a summary and directions for future research.
2. Background and experimental design
Ever since the initial experimental ﬁndings suggesting that mere ownership of a good may
induce a reference-dependent preference structure, neoclassical models have been under heavy
scrutiny, as their basic independence assumption is clearly violated in such scenarios. In addition
to casting doubt on closely held economic doctrines, inﬂuential commentators have used the
disparity ﬁndings to question the entire basis of welfare economics and common interpretations
of indifference curves. From a policy perspective, Knetsch [12] notes the importance of
the disparity ﬁndings as follows: ‘‘it is likely that, among other implications, losses are
understated, standards are set at inappropriate levels, policy selections are biased, too many
environmentally degrading activities are encouraged, and too few mitigation efforts are
undertaken.’’ More narrowly, the value disparity has been viewed implicitly as a failure of
survey methods [26].
Before becoming immersed in the ﬁeld experimental design, it is worthwhile to summarize
intuitively the major theoretical predictions of neoclassical and endowment theory.
4 Assume that
an individual derives utility, u ¼ uðg;xÞ; from consuming two goods, X and G; where X could be
viewed as a composite commodity, quantities of which could be measured in money units, and G
is a particular consumption good. Consider Fig. 1, where perfect substitution exists between the
two goods. In this case, neoclassical theory predicts WTA=WTP: minimum WTA (or Hicksian
equivalent surplus) of x12x0 is equivalent to maximum WTP (or Hicksian compensating surplus)
of x0   x2: Upon relaxing the perfect substitutability assumption, and assuming quasi-concave
utility functions, these linear indifference curves become strictly convex to the origin, as presented
in Fig. 2. In this case, Randall and Stoll [22] demonstrate that the WTA/WTP disparity depends
on the ‘‘price ﬂexibility of income’’: the elasticity of the marginal valuation of g with respect to x:
Hanemann [6] later demonstrated that the ‘‘price ﬂexibility of income’’ is analytically equivalent
to the ratio of the ordinary income elasticity of demand for the good to the Allen-Uzawa elasticity
of substitution between the good and the numeraire.
Hanemann [6] argues that the large WTA/WTP disparities that have been observed in the
literature can, therefore, be reconciled with neoclassical theory. Examining Fig. 2, and measuring
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4Space limitations preclude me from doing this topic justice. I point the interested reader to Hanemann [7], who
provides an excellent elucidation of the economic theory of WTA and WTP.
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5 In this case,
WTA ¼ x12x04x0   x2 ¼ WTP; due to income (movement to a higher indifference curve) and
substitution (curvature of the indifference curves) effects, neoclassical theory predicts value
divergences.
6 In practice, it would appear that the substitution effect would hold more
prominence in shaping the value disparity than would the income effect. The intuition behind
this thought is contained in the Engel aggregation condition, which requires that the income
elasticities of demand for g and x; weighted by their respective budget shares, sum to one. While
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Fig. 2. Convex to the origin indifference curves and WTA/WTP.
Fig. 1. Linear indifference curves and WTA/WTP.
5Note that the curvature of the indifference curves could be thought of as merely a reﬂection of convexity of the
expenditure function in g. And, if one assumes utility is quasi-convex in g, then a corner solution emerges rather than an
interior solution. In this case, indifference curves are concave and the substitution effect becomes positive, rather than
negative.
6Recall that for price changes, the difference between the compensating and equivalent variation depends simply on
the income effect.
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from zero to inﬁnity.
7
Insights on the disparity are identical if one considers movements along different segments of
the same indifference curve. One can gain this intuition by choosing any point along either convex
indifference curve in Fig. 2 and moving equidistant (in g) along the indifference curve in opposite
directions. Instead of both income and substitution effects causing the divergence, in this case the
divergence is caused purely by convexity of the indifference curve. Depending on the structure of
the utility function, the divergence observed along different segments of the same indifference
curve can be greater or smaller than differences observed when moving along different
indifference curves. A majority of the WTA/WTP experimental studies cited in Horowitz and
McConnell [8] fall into one of these two categories, having subjects moving along either different
indifference curves or different portions of the same indifference curve.
The simple intuition behind Hanneman’s [6] neoclassical arguments can be tested by
appropriately compensating Group 2 subjects so that they state their maximum WTP to move
from g0 to g1 along the same indifference curve as Group 1 subjects. In Fig. 2, this can be achieved
simply by endowing Group 2 subjects at point ðg0;x1Þ and asking those subjects to state their
maximum WTP to move from g0 to g1: Comparing these endowment-adjusted WTP values with
WTA statements yields a relatively clean test of whether the indifference curve is reversible, as
neoclassical theory predicts. Such an exercise naturally controls for both income (different
indifference curves) and substitution (curvature of the indifference curves) effects.
This demonstrates the intuition of List [17], who examined trading patterns of sports
memorabilia on the ﬂoor of a sportscard show, and trading patterns of collector pins in a market
constructed by Walt Disney World at the Epcot Center in Orlando, Florida. In one treatment a
subject is endowed with good A and has the option to trade it for good B: In a second treatment, a
different subject is endowed with good B and has the option to trade it for good A: Since subjects
are allocated to one of the two treatments randomly, for preferences to be consistent, the
proportion of subjects who choose B over A should be equal to one minus the proportion who
choose A over B:
The experimental test constructed below represents the value elicitation analogs of these trading
tests in the marketplace. If preferences are deﬁned over changes in consumption, then one could
envision a kink for Group 1 subjects at point ðg1;x0Þ; this kink would cause the indifference curve
for Group 1 subjects to pivot from U1 to UE
1 ; as displayed in Fig. 3. Under neoclassical
arguments, WTA should be measured as x12x0; but assuming the endowment effect induces the
indifference curve to pivot, WTA becomes x32x04x12x0; which illustrates the agent’s aversion
to sacriﬁce a good once it becomes part of her endowment. The WTA/WTP disparity would be
exacerbated if a similar kink formed for Group 2 subjects, as it would pivot their indifference
curves counterclockwise from point ðg0;x1Þ: This seems unlikely if X represents money;
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7Care should be taken not to dismiss income effects out of hand, however. Under certain scenarios, the spacing of the
indifference curves is quite important. While in Fig. 2, I have implicitly assumed a unitary income elasticity by making
the indifference curves for U0 and U1 parallel displacements, if I assumed an income elasticity greater than 1, or that the
marginal rate of substitution increased along any ray from the origin, the WTA/WTP disparity would increase. The
opposite would occur, of course, if G were an inferior good—the marginal rate of substitution would decrease along any
ray from the origin.
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value increases once it becomes part of an individual’s endowment.
Following Sugden [25], one can push the neoclassical explanation a bit further by exploiting the
relationship between the WTA/WTP disparity and the predicted effect of income on WTP. One
advantage of such an exercise is that it provides a further use of the observed WTA/WTP ratio
and permits an examination of whether the observed ratio is consistent with economic intuition.
To add structure to the argument, I continue with Fig. 2 and assume that the initial endowment is
ðg0;x0Þ: As previously suggested, the individual’s WTP to move from g0 to g1 is deﬁned as
follows:
8
uðg1;x0   WTPðx0ÞÞ ¼ uðg0;x0Þ; ð1Þ
where WTPðx0Þ¼x02x2: Similarly, endowment-adjusted WTP is
uðg1;x1   WTPðx1ÞÞ ¼ uðg0;x1Þ; ð2Þ
where WTPðx1Þ¼x12x0: WTA is deﬁned analogously, thus
uðg0;x0 þ WTAÞ¼uðg1;x0Þ: ð3Þ
Using the intuition that x1   x0 ¼ WTA; and these simple deﬁnitions of WTA and WTP, the
following relationship is derived:
uðg1;x0 þ WTA   WTPðx0 þ WTAÞÞ ¼ uðg0;x0 þ WTAÞ¼uðg1;x0Þ: ð4Þ
Equality of the ﬁrst and third expressions implies x0 þ WTA2WTPðx0 þ WTAÞ¼x0;
or WTPðx0 þ WTAÞ¼WTA: A ﬁrst-order approximation of WTPðx0 þ WTAÞ yields
WTAEWTP+WTA @WTP








Fig. 3. Endowment effects and the WTA/WTP disparity.
8The following formulation closely follows Sugden [25].
J.A. List / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47 (2004) 486–509 491Eq. (5) provides a convenient test of neoclassical theory, as [1 WTP/WTA] values can be




The construct laid out above provides a rich set of predictions associated with the endowment
effect and neoclassical theory. As aforementioned, Fig. 3 provides a framework with which to
understand the intuition behind the theory of the endowment effect. If subjects instantaneously
place an ‘‘attachment value’’ on a good once it becomes part of their endowment, then a kink for
Group 1 subjects at point ðg1;x0Þ causes the indifference curve for Group 1 subjects to pivot and
rotate clockwise. This leads to point ðg0;x1Þ being on a lower indifference curve, which induces
WTA 4 WTP. Thus, if the endowment effect is important, it should create a wedge between
WTA and WTP values even if endowment-adjusted WTP values are elicited from Group 2
subjects. Alternatively, whether indifference curves are linear or convex to the origin, neoclassical
theory predicts equivalence of WTA and endowment-adjusted WTP, but provides an explanation
for deviations between WTP and WTA values.
The ﬁeld experimental treatments attempt to create an environment that allows an investigation
into these theories while simultaneously providing a test of whether market experience induces
behavior more in line with neoclassical predictions. Fig. 4 illustrates the general experimental
design. U, C, and A are the initial endowment points. Subjects endowed at Point U are asked to
state their maximum willingness to pay to acquire g12g0 units of G; this is termed WTP. Subjects
endowed at Point C are also asked to state their maximum willingness to pay to acquire g12g0
units of G; this dollar value represents endowment-adjusted WTP. Finally, subjects endowed at
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Fig. 4. Experimental design.
9Given that many experimental studies in the literature report WTA values that exceed WTP by factors greater than
two (for everyday consumables), using Eq. (5), neoclassical theory predicts that if an agent were instantly endowed with
$100, then she would spend at least $50 more on the good in question. Most scholars probably would say that this value
is implausibly large.
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which represents WTA.
This simple experimental design is used for several different treatment types. Before presenting
the various treatments, I should note that I was careful in choosing goods the individual would
actually consume rather than put up for trade or sale immediately after the transaction. During
the exit interview, more than 90 percent of the subjects stated that they planned to consume the
good in question (e.g., keep it for their own collection). The good I used is a variety of Kansas
City Royals game ticket stubs dated June 14, 1996. The stubs were issued for admission to the
baseball game in which Cal Ripken Jr. broke the world record for consecutive games played. I was
able to obtain numerous copies of the ticket stubs because I attended the event. Given that I rarely
see this particular piece of memorabilia on the market, market value is difﬁcult to determine, but I
have seen a quality piece fetch as much as $40.
The sportscard marketplace is a natural venue where the good’s attributes play an integral role
in its valuation. This link is perhaps best illustrated by an example. Making use of the grading
system of a well-known third-party, Professional Sports Authenticators (PSA), consider the value
difference between a PSA-graded (Gem Mint 10) Ken Griffey Jr. 1989 Upper Deck baseball card
and an identical Griffey card, but one which has slight fraying on one corner—a Mint 9 card. The
Gem Mint version of the Griffey Jr. card readily sells for $2700, whereas the identical Griffey Jr.
card with slight corner fraying will garner only between $125 and $350. The price difference is
mainly driven by perceived scarcity and available substitutes: as of April 14, 2002, approximately
two percent of all Griffey cards were graded PSA 10 (44,358 have been graded), while about 30
percent received grades of PSA 9.
To provide variation in quality across the various Ripken ticket stubs, I hand-graded more than
500 ticket stubs to provide enough goods that varied across important attributes. In trying to
maintain consistency with PSA guidelines and standards, I graded 180 of the stubs as ‘‘near mint’’
(corresponding to a PSA grade of 7) and 150 as ‘‘mint’’ (corresponding to a PSA grade of 9), with
the remaining stubs generally grading below near mint. I then placed them in protective
stubholders with the grade clearly marked.
The various treatments, which are depicted in Fig. 4, can be summarized as follows:
2.1.1. Treatment A subjects
WTA1: Subjects are endowed with a ‘‘near mint’’ (grade 7) ticket stub and asked to state their
minimum WTA to sell the stub. Subjects are reminded that the stub is graded near mint and that
an examination of typical grading distributions reveals that only about 10 percent of graded items
actually grade below near mint.
WTA2: Subjects are endowed with a mint (grade 9) ticket stub and asked to state their
minimum WTA to sell the stub. Subjects are reminded that the stub is graded mint and that
typical distributions of grading reveal that only about 2 percent of graded items actually grade
above mint.
2.1.2. Treatment C subjects
WTPC1: Subjects are endowed with the average WTA value from treatment WTA1 ($13.50)
and asked to state their maximum WTP for a near mint ticket stub. Subjects are reminded that the
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about 10 percent of graded items actually grade below near mint.
WTPC2: Subjects are endowed with the average WTA value from treatment WTA2 ($16.75)
and asked to state their maximum WTP for a mint ticket stub. Subjects are reminded that the stub
is graded mint and that typical distributions of grading reveal that only about 2 percent of graded
items actually grade above mint.
2.1.3. Treatment U subjects
WTPU1: Subjects are asked to state their maximum WTP for a near mint ticket stub. Subjects
are reminded that the stubis graded near mint and that an examination of typical grading
distributions reveals that only about 10 percent of graded items actually grade below near mint.
WTU2: Subjects are asked to state their maximum WTP for a mint ticket stub. Subjects are
reminded that the stubis graded mint and that typical distrib utions of grading reveal that only
about 2 percent of graded items actually grade above mint.
By crossing these six treatments with two distinct elicitation institutions (more fully discussed
below), I have an experimental design comprised of 12 treatments. These treatments are
summarized in Table 1.I nTable 1, I also denote the number of subjects included in each
treatment—30 subjects—for a total of 360 subjects.
Prior to discussing the experimental procedures, it is worthwhile to discuss the various
treatments and hypotheses related to these treatments. Comparing values from WTA1 (WTA2)
with WTPU1 (WTPU2) represents the typical experimental examination in the extant literature.
Yet a comparison of these WTA and WTP measures of value will not yield a clear-cut delineation
between major theories: both neoclassical and alternative theories predict that value divergences
may occur across these measures. Many commentators have conceded this point but have argued
that the observed disparities are too large to be explained by standard neoclassical arguments.
Whether the size of the divergence makes intuitive sense is up for debate, however. As Bateman




Stubquality WTA WTP WTP
(endowment-adjusted)
Near mint Denoted WTA1 Denoted WTPU1 Denoted WTPC1
Random nth: n ¼ 30 Random nth: n ¼ 30 Random nth: n ¼ 30
BDM: n ¼ 30 BDM: n ¼ 30 BDM: n ¼ 30
Mint Denoted WTA2 Denoted WTPU2 Denoted WTPC2
Random nth: n ¼ 30 Random nth: n ¼ 30 Random nth: n ¼ 30
BDM: n ¼ 30 BDM: n ¼ 30 BDM: n ¼ 30
Notes: Each cell represents two unique treatments. For example, ‘‘Random nth: n ¼ 30’’ in row 1, column 1 denotes
that one treatment had 30 individuals offering, in a random nth price auction, to sell their endowed good—a ‘‘near
mint’’ Ripken ticket stub. The treatment is labeled WTA1, for WTA for the ‘‘near mint’’ stub. ‘‘BDM’’ denotes Becker–
DeGroot–Marschak [2] discrete auction mechanism. No subject participated in more than one treatment.
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and WTP is too large to be compatible with Hicksian theory’’.
This represents the ﬁrst point of departure in this study—gathering WTPC1 and WTPC2 values
to delineate between the major theoretical explanations of the value disparity. A comparison of
WTPC1 and WTA1 (WTPC2 and WTA2) measures of value provides a relatively clean test of the
neoclassical model. As outlined above, by appropriately compensating subjects who are randomly
allocated into the WTP treatments, one can roughly place them on the same indifference curve
that WTA subjects occupy. While neoclassical theory allows value divergences along different
indifference curves, movements along (up and down) identical segments of the same indifference
curve should yield equivalent value estimates. Hence, I endow subjects in treatments WTPC1 and
WTPC2 with money before they state their WTP values.
The amount of money is determined by the average realized values in the WTA1 and WTA2
treatments—WTPC1 (WTPC2) subjects are endowed with the average WTA value in treatment
WTA1 (WTA2). In this case, since income and substitution effects are controlled, neoclassical
theory predicts that WTPC1 = WTA1 and WTPC2 = WTA2. Endowment theory predicts that
pivoting of the indifference curve renders WTPC1 o WTA1 and WTPC2 o WTA2. These
disparate predictions form the basis of the ﬁrst test of neoclassical versus endowment theory.
10
This leads to a second test of the value disparity that relates to the substitutability of the two
goods with money. As Randall and Stoll [22] note, elasticity of substitution values critically
depend on friction within the marketplace: in markets with zero transactions costs the goods
possess the same traits as money. In my particular case, the key question relates to the amount of
‘‘friction’’ one confronts in attempting to buy or sell the stub at the market price. Since it is not
easy to have strong intuitions about elasticity of substitution values, I used my personal insights
gained from the marketplace as a dealer/consumer for more than two decades. Given that even
when an economic agent is willing to pay (accept) the going market rate, dealing in thin markets,
such as scarce, high-quality sports memorabilia (mint stubs), presents much more friction than
dealing in thicker markets (near mint stubs); therefore, I determined that the mint treatments
would be associated with more convex indifference curves (I return to this issue in Section 4).
Thus, comparison of data across stubs represents a rough attempt at manipulating the
substitutability of the good in question. Economic intuition implies that a movement to mint stubs
(WTA2 and WTPC2) from near mint stubs (WTA1 and WTPC2) will result in movement to a
higher indifference curve (income effect) that is more convex to the origin (substitution effect). In
this case, regardless of the shape of the indifference curves, neoclassical theory predicts that
WTA2/WTPC2=WTA1/WTPC1=1.
Alternatively, under popular variants of reference-dependent theory, individuals recognize
decision problems as gains or losses relative to a reference point. Thus the individual has a
preference ordering over the goods that depends on the current asset position, implying that
preferences conditional on one reference point may be different from preferences conditional on
another reference point. Individuals that are ‘‘loss averse’’ are expected to have kinked
indifference curves at the reference point. Morrison [20] represents such a relationship by rotating
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10I am not the ﬁrst to compare WTA with endowment-adjusted WTP statements of value (see, for example, [9,11]).
Yet to my knowledge this line of research is the ﬁrst to examine endowment-adjusted and WTP value statements in an
actual marketplace.
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at the reference point, Morrison [20] shows that the endowment effect is positively correlated with
indifference curve convexity. The intuition behind this argument can be seen in Fig. 3: the kink at
point ðg1;x0Þ causes the indifference curve to pivot from U1 to UE
1 ; yielding a WTA value of
x32x0; which increases as indifference curve convexity increases conditional on similar degrees of
pivot at the reference point. Thus, following Morrison’s [20] line of argument, endowment theory
predicts that WTA2/WTPC2 4 WTA1/WTPC1 4 1.
11
2.2. Experimental procedure
The experiment was run on the ﬂoor of various sportscard shows in a large southern city. Each
participant’s experience typically followed four steps: (1) completing a survey, (2) learning
the auction rules; (3) considering the bid (offer), and (4) conclusion of the transaction and
exit interview. In Step 1, the monitor approached potential subjects entering the trading
card show and inquired about their interest in baseball collectibles. If the subject was interested
in baseball memorabilia, then the monitor asked the potential subject if he/she would like
to ﬁll out a survey that would take about 5min (the survey is available at http://www.aere.
org/journal/index.html). If the individual agreed, the monitor brieﬂy explained that in return
for completing the survey the subject would receive their endowment, if applicable. After
physically being given the appropriate endowment (when applicable), the subject proceeded to ﬁll
out the survey. The monitor worked one-on-one with the participant and no time limit was
imposed.
In Step 2, the monitor informed subjects in Treatment types U and C (A) that they now had
the opportunity to bid (offer) in an auction for the good on the table (their good). After inspecting
the good, the monitor thoroughly explained the rules of the applicable allocation institution:
either a random nth price auction or a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) discrete-choice
auction.
Following List and Shogren [19], the random nth-price auction can be explained in four simple
steps: (1) each bidder submits a bid (offer); (2) each bid (offer) is rank-ordered from lowest
to highest; (3) the monitor selects a random number (n) uniformly distributed between 2 and
Z (Z bidders); and (4) in the WTP case, the monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the
ðn   1Þ highest bidders at the nth-price; in the WTA case, the monitor buys one unit each from the
ðn   1Þ lowest bidders and pays the nth-lowest bid (http://www.aere.org/journal/index.html
contains the experimental instructions for the WTP random nth price auction).
12
As described in Shogren et al. [23], the BDM random pricing mechanism works as follows. If
the agent is in the WTP (WTA) treatments, she is deemed a buyer (seller) and asked to determine
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11A ﬁnal, much more qualiﬁed and less revealing test of the substitutability effect revolves around a comparison of
WTA and WTP values. Since lower elasticity of substitution values map into larger ‘‘price ﬂexibility of income’’ values,
WTA2/WTPU2 may be larger than WTA1/WTPU1. This hypothesis must be qualiﬁed because under neoclassical
arguments the disparity depends on both the ordinary income elasticity of demand for the good and the Allen-Uzawa
elasticity of substitution. If the ordinary income elasticity of demand is roughly equivalent for the mint and near mint
stubs, then neoclassical theory predicts WTA2/WTPU2 4 WTA1/WTPU1. Since, theoretically, substitutability is
related to indifference curve convexity (see [20]), endowment theory makes a similar prediction.
12The BDM instructions are identical except for the necessary rule changes (see below).
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price schedule:
I will buy (sell) I will not buy (sell)
If the price is $ 50.00
    
    
If the price is $ 20.00
If the price is $ 19.50
If the price is $ 19.00
    
    
If the price is $ 0.00
The price range for the goods was $0 to $50.00, in steps of $0.50. This range was chosen because
it encompassed all of the offers (bids) in the WTA (WTP) random nth price auctions for both
good types and because it included the highest price I had seen the good bring ($40).
In the WTP random nth price auction treatments, after completing the survey, learning the
auction rules, and examining the good, each participant privately wrote a bid on the bidding sheet
and placed it in an opaque box. The monitor informed the participant that his or her bid would
not be opened until after the show and that all bids would be destroyed when the research project
was completed. In the WTA random nth price auction treatments, after physically giving the
subject the good, the subject ﬁlled out the survey. He or she proceeded to learn the auction rules
and then completed the recording sheet by stating his or her minimum WTA to sell the stub. Each
subject worked one-on-one with the monitor and no time limit was imposed on his or her
inspection of the stub. In Step 4, the monitor explained that if the participant won the auction, she
would be contacted by email or telephone within 3 days. Upon receipt of payment, I would send
her the stub(or money). I paid all postage.
In the BDM treatments, everything was identical except the timing of the transaction. After
collecting the bidding sheet, one price from the sheet was selected randomly via a draw out of a
box that included the 101 slips of potential prices. If a buyer was willing to pay at least the random
price, she immediately purchased the stub. If the seller was willing to accept less than or equal to
the random price, she immediately sold the stub.
Given that learning might inﬂuence whether agents conform to neoclassical theoretic
predictions, an added advantage of experimenting within the sportscard marketplace is that
individuals bring varying levels of experience to the experiment. For example, while some agents
are intense consumers, engaging in numerous trades and transactions in a typical month, others
are more casual consumers who execute a transaction quite infrequently. To ensure that sub-
populations are similar across treatments, I randomize participants into one of the 12 treatment
types—at the top of each hour I changed treatments, and continued to change treatments until
each cell had 30 observations (note that I completed the WTA and the random nth price auction
treatments ﬁrst because I needed these values for completion of the WTP endowment-adjusted
and BDM treatments).
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subjects participated in more than one treatment. Second, note that subjects received the stub as
payment for completing the survey, and had the stubin their possession while ﬁlling out the
survey. These two attributes have been found to strengthen signiﬁcantly the endowment effect.
Third, since I am not testing the incentive-compatibility of the two institutions, and I want to
avoid any excess noise, I inform the subjects that it is in their best interest to bid (offer) their true
value in the auctions. I reinforce this notion via several examples that illustrate the optimal
strategy of truthtelling in the two mechanisms.
3. Results
To put my ﬁndings into perspective, I ﬁrst review the results of List [17], who controlled for
Hicksian income and substitution effects by asking subjects to choose between bundles—in one
treatment the subject is endowed with good A and has the option to trade it for good B;i na
second treatment, a different subject is endowed with good B and has the option to trade it for
good A. Pooling his data across more than 300 subjects yields Fig. 5, which makes the trade
probability a function of trading intensity (trades in a typical month—see question 2 in the survey
contained in Appendix A). In support of the received literature, List’s [17] ﬁeld evidence suggests
that an inefﬁciently low number of trades occur for naı¨ve traders, consistent with endowment
theory. In contrast, this anomaly is not evident for intense consumers. Fig. 5 reveals that
individual behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading rates intensify. This study
follows List [17] and focuses on trading intensity and its association with the disparity.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the new WTA/WTP data. The top panel of Table 2
provides data from the random nth price auction treatments, whereas the bottom panel
summarizes the BDM data. Columns 1–6 display the six distinct treatments used for each auction
type. Central tendencies of the variables reported in Table 2 suggest that the subgroups are
relatively similar in important demographic characteristics. For example, while there is substantial
































Fig. 5. Summary of List’s (2001b) trading results.
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Table 2
Sample statistics
WTA1 WTA2 WTPU1 WTPU2 WTPC1 WTPC2
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Random nth
Bid or offer 13.53 16.78 4.32 4.90 4.25 5.98
(9.2) (12.0) (4.85) (4.57) (4.61) (6.12)
Trading experience 4.3 5.9 3.8 4.9 4.3 6.0
(3.4) (3.9) (3.7) (3.2) (4.6) (6.1)
Years of market 6.9 6.9 8.7 14.3 10.1 12.6
experience (9.2) (6.4) (8.3) (14.3) (13.5) (13.1)
Income 3.3 3.4 3.4 4.6 4.0 3.7
(1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (2.2)
Age 31.9 30.9 31.1 35.6 35.7 28.8
(14.9) (10.6) (12.7) (12.7) (15.4) (11.6)
Gender 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.72
(0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35) (0.45)
Education 2.8 3.4 3.2 3.9 3.5 3.5
(1.7) (1.7) (1.5) (1.4) (1.8) (1.7)
BDM
Bid or offer 11.98 13.47 5.85 6.67 5.53 7.78
(11.6) (12.1) (5.1) (8.7) (5.9) (6.7)
Trading experience 4.4 4.8 5.6 5.2 3.5 4.1
(4.5) (5.3) (4.8) (5.1) (3.3) (3.7)
Years of market 10.7 9.5 8.4 9.5 8.5 7.9
experience (11.1) (10.5) (6.3) (12.7) (8.6) (9.2)
Income 3.9 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.4
(2.4) (2.1) (2.3) (2.1) (2.0) (1.9)
Age 33.8 30.4 32.1 30.3 29.9 34.0
(14.1) (13.1) (14.6) (14.0) (11.8) (14.9)
Gender (male) 0.86 0.78 0.79 0.88 0.86 0.87
(0.35) (0.42) (0.42) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35)
Education 3.8 3.4 3.7 3.1 2.6 3.0
(1.8) (1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (1.5) (1.5)
Notes:
1. Thirty subjects are included in each of the 12 treatments, for a total of 360 subjects.
2. Trading experience represents the number of trades made in a typical month.
3. Years of market experience denotes years that the subject has been active in the market.
4. Income denotes categorical variable (1–8): (1) Less than $10,000, (2) $10,000 to $19,999, (3) $20,000 to
$29,999, (4) $30,000 to $39,999, (5) $40,000 to $49,999, (6) $50,000 to $74,999, (7) $75,000 to $99,999, (8) $100,000
or over.
5. Age denotes actual age in years.
6. Gender denotes categorical variable: 0, if female; 1, if male.
7. Education denotes categorical variable. (1) Eighth grade or less, (2) high school, (3) 2-year college, (4) other post-high
school, (5) 4-year college, (6) graduate school education.
J.A. List / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47 (2004) 486–509 499WTPC2 (6.0) and average years of market experience across treatments WTA2 (6.9) and WTPU2
(14.3) in the random nth price auctions, in general the data suggest that the randomization
procedure was reasonably effective in allocating the 360 subjects randomly into the various
treatment cells. This casual observation is veriﬁed by a one-way multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) test, which compares the multivariate means of the six individual-speciﬁc variables.
Results from the MANOVA test yield a ‘‘d’’ value equal to 0, which suggests that the null
hypothesis that the means of each group are the same n-dimensional multivariate vector cannot be
rejected at the po0:05 level.
Concerning valuation estimates, I ﬁnd that, consistent with expectations, sellers have higher
asking prices for the mint ticket stubthan for the near mint stub : in the random nth price auctions
the difference is $3.25 (23.9 percent), while in the BDM auctions the difference is $1.49 (12.4
percent). Data from the WTP treatments exhibit similar patterns—differences range from 13.8
percent to over 40 percent, with larger differences being associated with the endowment-adjusted
WTP treatments. Yet I should note that not all of the data are perfectly organized. For example,
economic intuition suggests that WTP values in the endowment-adjusted treatments should be
larger than WTP statements in the WTPU treatments.
13 This expectation is realized in the mint
stubauctions, b ut it is not true in the near mint treatments, where average values in WTPU1
across both auction types are larger than average values in WTPC1. While not too much should
be made of statistically insigniﬁcant differences, the astute reader will notice some similar data
anomalies below.
More importantly for our purposes, across both allocation institutions there is a large
discrepancy between WTA and each WTP measure of value. Whereas WTA values are around
$13, WTP values tend to be in the $5 range. Even when subjects are endowment-adjusted, the
differences are large. And, all of these value differences are statistically signiﬁcant at the po0:05
level using a large-sample t-test. In each case, this ﬁnding is substantiated when one considers
results from a Mann–Whitney rank-sum test of treatment differences. The rank-sum test is a non-
parametric test that has a null hypothesis of no treatment effect, or that the two samples are
derived from identical populations. These preliminary results suggest that endowment theory does
an adequate jobof organizing the pooled data.
14
The data can be pushed a bit further by using the insights gained from Eq. (5): @WTP/@y=
1–WTP/WTA. Using results from the BDM mint auctions (BDM WTA2 versus WTPU2), I ﬁnd
that @WTP/@Y=0.505, which suggests that if an agent was instantly endowed with $100, he
would spend about $50 on Ripken ticket stubs. Even if this comparative static represented
increased spending on sports memorabilia in general, it seems much too large for the average
consumer. In sum, therefore, the data indicate that there is a large value disparity in the ﬁeld.
Another interesting trend in the data is that WTA/WTP discrepancies are somewhat smaller in
the BDM auctions than in the random nth price auctions. This result is unexpected, as previous
laboratory data reported in Shogren et al. [23] suggest that the disparity is larger in BDM auctions.
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13Subjects randomly allocated into the WTP endowment-adjusted treatments received the average offer from the
appropriate random nth price auction: each WTPC1 subject received $13.50 and each WTPC2 subject received $16.75.
For consistency, I endowed subjects with these same dollar values whether they were in the BDM or random nth
auction treatments.
14Note that if one assumes preference/value uncertainty, neoclassical theory also provides a viable explanation for
these ﬁndings. I will return to this issue in the concluding section.
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random nth price auction data are not signiﬁcantly different statistically, thus I pool the data below.
Table 3 presents WTA and WTP measures of value across ﬁve distinct subsamples of the data.
Figures in the ﬁrst row are derived from the pooled sample, and highlight the value disparity that
is evident in the data. In the auctions for the near mint stub, the WTA/WTP ratios are 2.5 (WTA1
versus WTPU1) and 2.6 (WTA1 versus WTPC1). The ratios are comparable across auctions for
the mint stub—2.6 (WTA2 versus WTPU2) and 2.1 (WTA2 versus WTPC2).
15 While these ratios
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Table 3
Bid/offer sample statistics across consumer types
WTA1 WTA2 WTPU1 WTPU2 WTPC1 WTPC2
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Pooled
Bid or offer 12.76 15.12 5.08 5.78 4.89 6.88
(10.4) (12.0) (4.9) (7.0) (5.3) (6.4)
ðn ¼ 60Þð n ¼ 60Þð n ¼ 60Þð n ¼ 60Þð n ¼ 60Þð n ¼ 60Þ
‘‘Light’’ consumers
Bid or offer 23.40 22.21 3.34 2.75 4.75 5.06
(14.7) (13.7) (5.6) (3.8) (7.2) (9.9)
ðn ¼ 10Þð n ¼ 7Þð n ¼ 13Þð n ¼ 6Þð n ¼ 12Þð n ¼ 12Þ
‘‘Casual’’ consumers
Bid or offer 16.31 18.11 4.48 6.21 3.50 4.51
(11.6) (14.0) (5.7) (9.7) (4.7) (6.6)
ðn ¼ 35Þð n ¼ 28Þð n ¼ 30Þð n ¼ 24Þð n ¼ 34Þð n ¼ 32Þ
‘‘Intense’’ consumers
Bid or offer 7.78 12.51 5.68 5.50 6.71 9.59
(5.7) (9.4) (3.5) (4.4) (5.6) (5.2)
ðn ¼ 25Þð n ¼ 32Þð n ¼ 30Þð n ¼ 36Þð n ¼ 26Þð n ¼ 28Þ
‘‘Super-intense’’ consumers
Bid or offer 6.71 8.33 5.67 7.17 6.17 7.65
(5.7) (8.1) (4.1) (5.3) (4.1) (4.9)
ðn ¼ 12Þð n ¼ 15Þð n ¼ 12Þð n ¼ 12Þð n ¼ 9Þð n ¼ 10Þ
Notes: Data are pooled across BDM and random nth price auctions in each major treatment cell. ‘‘Light’’ consumers
are those that trade 0 times in a typical month; ‘‘Casual’’ consumers are those that trade less than 5 times in a typical
month; ‘‘Intense’’ consumers are those that trade 5 or more times in a typical month; ‘‘Super-Intense’’ consumers are
those that trade 9 or more times per month. In choosing these thresholds, I considered both the mean number of trades
in a typical month (4.7) and its standard deviation (4.2). Thus, Casual consumers are those subjects below the average
trading rate; Intense consumers are those subjects above the average trading rate, and Super-Intense consumers are
those consumers at least one standard deviation above the average trading rate.
15Recall that both neoclassical and endowment theory predict WTA2/WTPU2 4 WTA1/WTPU1. While that result
is observed here and in spots below, it is not consistently signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
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suggesting that there is a value disparity evident in the ﬁeld data, there is no evidence that WTA2/
WTPC2 4 WTA1/WTPC1. As we will see, this null result will continue to arise for ﬁner
classiﬁcations of the data, and suggests that the value disparity is not larger for goods that have
fewer available substitutes.
The remaining rows in Table 3 split the data by consumer type. I deﬁne ‘‘light’’ consumers as
those subjects that stated they trade zero times in a typical month; ‘‘casual’’ consumers execute
fewer than ﬁve trades in a typical month; ‘‘intense’’ consumers execute ﬁve or more trades per
month; and ‘‘super-intense’’ consumers trade at a rate of nine or more times per month. While
these thresholds may appear somewhat unscientiﬁc I have attempted to delineate by ﬁrst and
second moments of the trading variable. Because the average number of trades in a typical month
is 4.7, I label subjects below ﬁve trades per month as casual and those above ﬁve trades per month
as intense. And given that the standard deviation of the number of monthly trades is 4.2, I label
those subjects that execute nine or more trades (Emean+one standard deviation) as super-
intense. The general pattern of results does not rely on these thresholds, as will be illustrated in the
regression analysis summarized below.
Even though the subsamples of light consumers are small, the data strongly suggest that WTP is
much less than compensation demanded. Results of both a small sample t-test and a Mann–
Whitney rank-sum test of treatment differences suggest that WTA is greater than WTP for every
applicable treatment comparison at the po0:05 level. For light consumers, the ratio of WTA/
WTP ranges from 4.4 to 8, which is consistent with previous experimental studies, but at odds
with conventional economic theory. Using Eq. (5), these ratios suggest that if an agent were
instantly endowed with $100, he/she would spend approximately $80 on Ripken ticket stubs. I
suspect that even the most ardent of neoclassical supporters would ﬁnd this ﬁgure implausibly
high. Yet note again that these data provide no evidence that WTA2/WTPC2 4 WTA1/WTPC1.
Overall, these results are mirrored in the casual consumer subsample. While data from the
casual consumers indicate a lesser value disparity across the various treatment cells, in each case
the discrepancies are signiﬁcantly different from zero at conventional levels. And, use of Eq. (5)
again provides far-fetched @WTP/@y values.
Data contained in the lower rows of Table 3 paint a much different picture, however. In the
intense consumer group data, using small-sample t-tests I ﬁnd that WTA2 and WTPU2, as well as
WTA1 and WTPU1, are signiﬁcantly different at conventional levels using a one-sided alternative
(mint stubs: t ¼ 4:0 and near mint stubs: t ¼ 1:68). However, comparing WTA with endowment-
adjusted WTP values yields value ratios of 1.16 and 1.30, which are never signiﬁcantly different
from one using small-sample t-tests (mint stubs: t ¼ 1:46 and near mint stubs: t ¼ 0:68).
These ﬁndings are in accord with neoclassical theory. Rejection of the homogeneous null in the
ﬁrst set of results—WTA versus WTP—may well be due to a comparison between value estimates
drawn from different indifference curves. The latter set of null results, which arise from a
comparison of WTA and endowment-adjusted WTP, suggests that indifference curves are
reversible. This ﬁnding is consonant with neoclassical theory, which predicts that no disparity
should exist in such a setting. Yet it is important to note that if one takes the observed point
estimates literally, WTA/WTP ratios still provide seemingly large @WTP/@y values.
Even though these results begin to suggest that neoclassical theory holds promise in properly
organizing the data, empirical results for the super-intense consumer group make an even stronger
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equality null in any of the treatment comparisons; therefore I also cannot reject the null that
WTA2/WTPC2=WTA1/WTPC1=1. Furthermore, computed WTA/WTP ratios of approxi-
mately 1.15 provide more plausible @WTP/@y values: a $100 increase in income leads to
approximately $14 more being spent on Ripken ticket stubs.
But how plausible is this estimated income effect? Running the risk of making too much of a
few point estimates rather than relying on inference gained from the statistical tests, I will conduct
some back-of-the-envelope calculations to shed light on this issue. Average income levels in the
sample are roughly $30,000 (E3.5 on the survey) and average WTP values for near mint and mint
stubs are about $5 and $6. Assume now that the average person’s income increases by $100 to
$30,100. If WTP increased by the same proportion to income, it would increase by about $0.02 to
$5.02 or $6.02. To get the expected increase in WTP ($14), one would need to assume that WTP
increases with extremely large powers of income. This illustrates that when WTP is only a small
fraction of income, neoclassical theory predicts very small divergences, even smaller than what the
point estimates herein suggest.
To provide a sense of the relationship between the value disparity and market intensity, I
provide Fig. 6. Similar to Fig. 5, Fig. 6 reveals that individual behavior converges to the
neoclassical prediction as trading experience intensiﬁes. These empirical results supplement List’s
[17] trading results summarized in Fig. 5. Yet, with these new auction data one can more
meaningfully understand what is behind the data patterns observed in Fig. 6.
The statistical summary presented in Table 3 implies that less casual subjects state much lower
WTA ﬁgures than casual subjects, which induces the value divergence to lessen: super-intense
consumers’ WTA is approximately $17 less than light consumers’ WTA, while their WTP is
generally only $2–$4 greater. To provide further insights into the convergence process, I estimate
the following bid/offer model:
BO ¼ a þ b

































Fig. 6. Summary of WTA/WTP ratios.
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offer, e is the well-behaved error component, and a and b are parameters to be estimated.
Variables in X are listed in Table 2, and include market intensity, number of years in the market,
annual income, age, gender, and two dichotomous treatment variables: (i) denoting whether the
subject was bidding/offering for the mint versus near mint stub and (ii) whether the subject was in
the endowment-adjusted versus WTP treatment. Estimation of Eq. (6), therefore, does not
represent a means to pit neoclassical theory against endowment theory; rather, it provides insights
into the factors that inﬂuence the bid/offer level.
Before discussing the empirical estimates, a few important points should be mentioned. First, to
account for censoring (zero bids in the WTP treatments), in the bid models I present estimates
from both ordinary least squares and Tobit models. Second, since there were signs of non-
spherical disturbances, I use White’s robust standard errors. Third, because there is evidence that
learning may be non-linear, I include models that have market intensity entering non-linearly.
Fourth, since income is used as a control variable in the main speciﬁcations I do not allow
interactions or introduce it as seven income dummies. Fifth, due to multicollinearity I exclude
education from the main speciﬁcations but note that results are robust to its inclusion.
Summary estimates of Eq. (6) are presented in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 provide
insights into whether market intensity is correlated with WTA statements of value. Empirical
results strongly support the unconditional ﬁndings in Table 3. For example, in the linear learning
model, the coefﬁcient estimate of intensity is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the po0:05 level
and implies that a one standard deviation increase in intensity (E4.2) is correlated with a $4.28
decrease in WTA. Coefﬁcients in the non-linear learning speciﬁcation also suggest that market
intensity is negatively correlated with compensation demanded, yet here the coefﬁcients suggest
that there are diminishing effects of intensity. The majority of other coefﬁcient estimates are not
signiﬁcantly different from zero at conventional levels, except for the dummy variable Mint.I n
this case, both coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcant at the po0:05 level and indicate that subjects
demanded about $4 more for mint stubs than they demanded for near mint stubs.
Columns 3–6 contain empirical estimates from the WTP speciﬁcations. In the Tobit models, I
present marginal effects computed at the sample means. While market intensity again enters in a
statistically signiﬁcant manner (with opposite sign compared to WTA), its marginal inﬂuence in
absolute value is much lower than comparable estimates in the WTA speciﬁcations. For example,
in the OLS linear model presented in column 3, an estimate of $0.21 suggests that WTP values are
$0.84 larger for each one standard deviation increase in market intensity. This estimate represents
about 20 percent of the marginal effect estimate in the WTA speciﬁcations. This result
corresponds well with ﬁndings in Table 3, and further suggests that the convergence of values
tends to occur for more intense subjects because of lower WTA values rather than because of
signiﬁcant increases in WTP. Consistent with the WTA speciﬁcations, there is some evidence that
learning dissipates for more intense consumers. In this case, the learning curve reaches its peak at
approximately 20 trades in a typical month, which is on the boundary of the sample (only one
WTP subject stated he executed more than 20 trades in a typical month).
16
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16While the results herein do not discern between treatment and selection effects, List [17] presents evidence that
suggests that both play a role.
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17
Interestingly, years of market experience gains statistical signiﬁcance at the po0:10 level in each
speciﬁcation, but appears to be attenuating the bidding level. And, I should note that this effect
has economic signiﬁcance: one extra year of experience maps into roughly a $0.10 decrease in




WTA WTA WTP WTP WTP WTP
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (Tobit) (OLS) (Tobit)
Intensity  1.07
    2.04
   0.21
   0.17
   0.39
   0.49
  
(0.28) (0.65) (0.08) (0.07) (0.20) (0.17)
Intensity
2 — 0.07




   3.9
   1.08 0.59 1.09 0.75
(2.0) (2.0) (0.83) (0.76) (0.83) (0.75)
Endowment-adjusted — — 0.24 0.50 0.25 0.37
(0.81) (0.76) (0.31) (0.73)
Years of market experience 0.12 0.10  0.07
   0.08
    0.07
   0.09
  
(0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Income  0.33  0.35  0.23  0.03  0.24  0.03
(0.50) (0.49) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21)
Gender (male)  0.67  0.52 1.43 1.62
  1.44 1.83
  
(3.38) (3.27) (1.02) (0.87) (1.0) (0.81)
Age 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant 12.2
   13.65
   2.32 1.21 1.96  0.25
(5.0) (4.1) (2.02) (1.83) (2.01) (1.8)
N 112 112 215 215 215 215
R2 0.17 0.19 0.04 — 0.05 —
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is subject’s offer or bid.
2. Mint equals 1 if subject was in the treatment with ‘‘mint’’ stubs; 0, otherwise. Endowment-adjusted equals 1 if subject
was in an endowment-adjusted treatment; 0, otherwise. Gender=1, if male; 0, otherwise.
3. Tobit coefﬁcients are marginal effects computed at the sample means. Standard errors are in parentheses beside
coefﬁcient estimates.
4. Sample sizes may not match with sample sizes in Table 1 due to some respondents not ﬁlling in the entire
questionnaire (e.g., not including income responses). Reported results omit these observations. If means are used to ﬁll
in the missing observations, results are not quantitatively or qualitatively different from the results reported.
5.
  (
 ) Denotes coefﬁcient estimate is signiﬁcant at the po0:05 (0.10) level.
17Of some interest is the fact that the income response coefﬁcient is found to be negative and insigniﬁcant in every
speciﬁcation. This is curious given that the raw data provided very large empirical estimates of @WTP/@y. To explore
this issue further, I allowed the income effect to vary across inexperienced and experienced subjects by augmenting
Eq. (6) with an interaction term—intensity   income. In these estimations, there is evidence that the income effect is
positive among inexperienced consumers and that the interaction term is negative and signiﬁcant at the po0:10 level.
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values map into larger WTA/WTP value differences. As an exploratory probe, I ran a new set of
empirical speciﬁcations that replaced the intensity and years of market experience variables with
an interaction term—intensity   years of market experience. The interaction term could be
thought of as a measure of the stock of market experience. In these models, the coefﬁcient of the
interaction term is generally positive and statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, suggesting




While the above results provide insights that may be interesting to economists and
policymakers, it is important to recognize the inherent limitations in the experimental design.
First, recall that all subjects randomly allocated into the WTP endowment-adjusted treatments
received the average offer from the appropriate random nth price auction: each WTPC1 subject
received $13.50 and each WTPC2 subject received $16.75. Considering the mean WTA values
across subject types (see Table 3), some subjects were likely over-endowed (intense and super-
intense consumers by nearly $7 in some cases) while others were likely under-endowed (light
consumers by nearly $10 in some cases). This design decision, therefore, may have compromising
effects if subjects’ WTP is highly responsive to this change in wealth.
To address this potential shortcoming, I returned to the same marketplace and ran three
ancillary WTP treatments (denoted WTP$6.71, WTP$13.50, and WTP$23.40) with 30 subjects
each to examine if this particular design choice unduly compromises my results. The three WTP
treatments are identical in every way possible to BDM treatment WTPC1, except that in WTP$X
I endow every subject with $X, where $X is $6.71, $13.50, or $23.40. Insights from these three new
treatments provide a sense of whether the over- and under-endowment inﬂuenced outcomes in the
experiment.
Rather than prolong the discussion, I only summarize the data and make a broader set of
results available at http://www.aere.org/journal/index.html. I am able to report several insights
from these ancillary data. First, in treatment WTP$13.50, I ﬁnd that the average bid of $5.11 is in
the ballpark of the average bid in BDM treatment WTPC1 ($5.53; see Table 2). This provides a
nice validity check. Second, in the overall data, the endowment difference does have an inﬂuence
on WTP statements of value, but not a statistically signiﬁcant one at conventional levels. For
example, in treatment WTP$6.71 (WTP$23.40) the average bid was $4.90 ($6.31) for the stub. It is
important to highlight that the average bid in treatment WTP$23.40 is roughly 25 percent greater
than the average bid in treatments WTP$6.31 and WTP$13.50; yet it is not statistically different
from either of these average bid estimates using a parametric t-test or a Wilcoxon non-parametric
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speciﬁcations these effects are signiﬁcant at conventional levels and imply that men bid about $1.75 more than women.
This result, coupled with the fact that men provide lower WTA values, suggests that men have lower WTA/WTP
disparities than women. This ﬁnding is potentially of interest, but due to small sample sizes of women, I ﬁnd the
evidence premature to make a statistical statement concerning the role of gender on the WTA/WTP disparity. This is an
interesting area for future research.
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important to recognize that there are differences in value statements across treatments WTP$6.71
and WTP$23.40.
Third, and most importantly, when I allocate these data into ‘‘individual experience cells’’ in a
fashion similar to Table 3 and compare them to WTA data, the qualitative results from Table 3 do
not change: inexperienced consumers exhibit a large value disparity, while the disparity is
signiﬁcantly attenuated among experienced consumers. This holds even when I limit the empirical
examination to the WTP$6.71 (WTP$23.40) data for experienced (inexperienced) consumers. It
appears that the $7 or $10 difference in endowed resources does not unduly inﬂuence the major
results, which makes sense given that the convergence of WTA/WTP values occurs for more
intense subjects because of lower WTA values rather than because of signiﬁcant increases in WTP.
A second potential limitation that should be discussed concerns the measure of substitution
across the two good types. Since it is not easy to have strong intuitions about elasticity of
substitution values, I used my knowledge of the marketplace to generate two goods that would
vary along levels of friction in exchange in the marketplace. In theory, one can use Eq. (5) directly
to measure substitution effects. Empirical results in Table 4 provide initial insights concerning this
issue and suggest that if one restricts income to have an isomorphic effect across good types, a
statistically insigniﬁcant responsiveness of WTP to income changes is a general outcome. Indeed,
as discussed above, the point estimate of the income coefﬁcient is found to be negative and
insigniﬁcant in every speciﬁcation. To further explore this issue, I augmented the WTP empirical
speciﬁcations in Table 4 to include an interaction term that allowed mint and near mint stubs to
have different income effects. In each speciﬁcation I ﬁnd that the estimated income effects are not
different from one another, or different from zero, at conventional levels. Thus the empirical
evidence does not support the assumption that mint stubs are characterized by more convex
indifference curves.
5. Concluding remarks
Substantial-experimental evidence indicates that a non-trivial gap exists between WTA and
WTP statements of value. These ﬁndings have induced even the most ardent supporters of
neoclassical theory to doubt the validity of certain neoclassical modeling assumptions. Now that
experimental economists have obtained several unique insights on the value disparity, however, it
is important to examine whether these experimental ﬁndings generalize to the types of
environments that theorists’ models purport to explain. Field experiments are a natural next
step, as they provide a useful intermediary between the sterile lab environment and the vagaries of
completely uncontrolled ﬁeld data.
In this study, I examined data gathered in a naturally occurring marketplace. Examining data
from 12 experimental treatments yields several unique insights. Most importantly, I ﬁnd evidence
that intensity of market experience and the WTA/WTP disparity are negatively related. In the
limit, intense consumers exhibit a negligible value disparity.
A few clear next steps in this research agenda are to bolster sample sizes of the experienced
consumer subset and examine whether these results spill over to the domain of public goods. This
latter extension is necessary since the disparity has such profound impacts on applied welfare
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obvious extensions, it makes sense to investigate the underlying learning mechanism at work. For
example, why do casual consumers display a large value disparity while intense consumers exhibit
an insigniﬁcant one? Is it simply that intense consumers are experienced arbitrageurs and via
learning they have become rational neoclassical utility maximizing agents? If so, what have they
learned? Is it to treat the good leaving their endowment as an opportunity cost rather than a loss?
Or are they more certain of their preferences because they are intense consumers? Could lower
transactions costs play a role?
While I ﬁnd answers to these provocative questions quite important, I defer a more extensive
discussion until another occasion. Yet I would be remiss not to discuss a few of the possible
explanations brieﬂy. In terms of neoclassical explanations, preference/value uncertainty seems to
be the logical place to start. Indeed, the overall pattern of observed results herein bears some
consistency with Kolstad and Guzman’s [16] theoretic bidding model in which subjects have
private values, but know them imperfectly. In their model, an increase in the level of individual
information decreases the gap between WTP and WTA. In addition, as the cost of information
increases, the expected gap between WTP and WTA increases. In my auction treatments, if casual
consumers have little idea about the market price of the ticket stub, they may be reluctant to sell it
quickly, and therefore might place a large offer price in the auction. Likewise, casual consumers
may not attach a high value to the good when bidding in the auction because they do not want to
overpay for the good. In this sense, if intense consumers have a better knowledge of values, then
the overall pattern of results observed in the auction data is consistent with neoclassical theory. If
more recent trading experience provides important market information needed to overcome the
value disparity (and years of experience are not as valuable), then the econometric estimates also
provide support for the information asymmetry conjecture.
19
The spirit of the auction results is also consistent with Kling et al. [10], who have recently
obtained promising experimental results suggesting that a neoclassical option-based theory may
have some predictive power. Using a good that is commonly traded in the sportscard market, they
ﬁnd that subjects state higher WTP values when they believe it would be difﬁcult to purchase the
good at a later date. And, subjects state lower WTP bid values if they believe that it would be
difﬁcult to reverse the purchasing transaction at a later date (i.e., sell the good later if they
purchase it in the experiment). Consistent with these insights, their data also suggest that WTA
values decrease in the difﬁculty of delay and increase in the difﬁculty of reversing the transaction.
With certain reasonable assumptions, their comparative static ﬁndings are consistent with the
results herein.
Besides more fully exploring these neoclassical-based explanations, I believe psychological
explanations can also provide insights into the effect of marketlike experience on the value
disparity. Empirical results from a recent set of market experiments reported in List [18] suggest
that agents have learned to treat goods leaving their endowment as an opportunity cost rather
than a loss. Thus, while psychological effects have been extremely popular in explaining the
endowment effect anomaly, they may also have some explanatory power regarding the
attenuation of the anomaly.
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